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Abstract—In this work we present a systematic presentation
attack against ECG biometrics. We demonstrate the attack’s
effectiveness using the Nymi Band, a wrist band that uses elec-
trocardiography (ECG) as a biometric to authenticate the wearer.
We instantiate the attack using a hardware-based Arbitrary
Waveform Generator (AWG), an AWG software using a computer
sound card, and the playback of ECG signals encoded as .wav
files using an off-the-shelf audio player. In two sets of experiments
we collect data from a total of 41 participants using a variety of
ECG monitors, including a medical monitor, a smartphone-based
mobile monitor and the Nymi Band itself.
We use the first dataset to understand the statistical differences in
biometric features that arise from using different measurement
devices and modes. Such differences are addressed through
the automated derivation of so-called mapping functions, whose
purpose is to transform ECG signals from any device in order to
resemble the morphology of the signals recorded with the Nymi
Band.
As part of our second dataset, we enroll users into the Nymi Band
and test whether data from any of our sources can be used for a
signal injection attack. Using data collected directly on the Nymi
Band we achieve a success rate of 81%. When only using data
gathered on other devices, this rate decreases to 43% when using
raw data, and 62% after applying the mapping function. While
we demonstrate the attack on the Nymi Band, we expect other
ECG-based authentication systems to most likely suffer from the
same, fundamental weaknesses.
I. INTRODUCTION
Passwords are the most prevalent mode of authentication
in many environments, including local workstations and on
the web. Despite their widespread use, they suffer from a
number of weaknesses [12], [13], [3]. Most notably, these
include users choosing weak passwords [15] and frequent
password-reuse [23]. Besides these weaknesses, the increasing
popularity of mobile and wearable devices gives rise to another
challenge: the lack of input devices to enter passwords (e.g.,
smart watches might only provide few buttons for user input).
Biometric recognition has become a popular approach to tackle
these limitations. Unlike passwords, which rely on the user
knowing something, biometrics make use of either distinctive
physiological properties or behavior. The former includes
fingerprints, iris patterns and DNA, while keystroke dynamics,
touchscreen input, mouse movements and eye movements have
been proposed for the latter. Electrocardiography (ECG) records
the electrical activity of the heart over time. While ECG is
typically recorded in a hospital using 10 electrodes placed on
the patient’s skin, it can also be measured using two electrodes,
thus making it feasible to record with wearable devices. Due
to its distinctiveness and universality (every living human has
a heartbeat that can be measured), ECG as a biometric has
attracted considerable attention in recent years. Unlike most
behavioral biometric systems, which exist mostly as research
projects, ECG-based biometrics have resulted in a successful
commercial product, the Nymi Band1.
In this paper, we provide a systematic attack against ECG
biometrics and demonstrate its effectiveness by applying it to
the Nymi Band. In order to this end, we first demonstrate our
capability of spoofing arbitrary ECG signals. To present the
spoofed signals we use three different devices, two Arbitrary
Waveform Generators (AWG), one software- and one hardware-
based, as well as the audio playback of ECG signals encoded
as .wav files using an off-the-shelf audio player. As such, the
technological barriers for the attacker are extremely low. We
collect ECG data from a total of 41 users and 5 devices. The
data shows that the morphology of the ECG signal depends
greatly on the device that was used. This difference constitutes
a major challenge, as a signal collected on one device can not
easily be used to carry out an attack on another. We tackle
this challenge by using the first half of our dataset to devise
and train a so-called mapping function. The purpose of this
function is to transform an ECG signal collected on one device
such that its morphology matches that of another. The method
to generate these functions is general and can even be used for
other biometrics. After enrolling users in the Nymi Band we
use the mapping function to impersonate the user by presenting
the (transformed) ECG signals collected on different devices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
gives background information about ECG and ECG biometrics.
Section III describes our hardware setup and the approach used
to spoof arbitrary ECGs. We outline our experimental design
and data collection in Section IV. In Section V we describe the
generation and training of the mapping function and outline
1http://www.nymi.com
Permission to freely reproduce all or part of this paper for noncommercial
purposes is granted provided that copies bear this notice and the full citation
on the first page. Reproduction for commercial purposes is strictly prohibited
without the prior written consent of the Internet Society, the first-named author
(for reproduction of an entire paper only), and the author’s employer if the
paper was prepared within the scope of employment.
NDSS ’17, 26 February - 1 March 2017, San Diego, CA, USA
Copyright 2017 Internet Society, ISBN 1-1891562-46-0
http://dx.doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2017.23408
the results of carrying out the attack in Section VI. Section VII
presents related work, we discuss possible countermeasures to
our attack in Section VIII and conclude the paper in Section IX.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Electrocardiography
The electrocardiogram (ECG) is a measurement of the
electrical activity of the heart. It is acquired through electrodes
placed on the patient’s skin, which are used to capture voltage
changes due to depolarization and repolarization of cardiac
cells, respectively provoking contraction and relaxation of the
cardiac muscle. The ECG is commonly used in clinical practice
for its crucial diagnostic capabilities [14]. In addition, the
present availability of low-cost ECG sensors has opened to
numerous applications in the area of wearable devices and
fitness monitoring [18], leading to pervasive acquisition of
ECG data.
Figure 1 shows an example ECG for one cardiac cycle,
together with the duration and amplitude features typically
extracted for authentication purposes (detailed in Section II-B).
It comprises five main waves, P, Q, R, S and T, which map
to specific heart events: the P wave indicates activation of the
atria (the upper heart chambers); the QRS complex corresponds
to the activation of the ventricles (the lower chambers); and
the T wave indicates ventricular repolarization.
Most of ECG recording systems are based on the so-called
Einthoven’s lead system, where each lead records the difference
of potential between two electrodes. Einthoven’s leads consist
of:
Lead I: Lead II: Lead III:
VI =  LA    RA VII =  LF    RA VIII =  LF    LA
where Vi is the voltage of lead i and  j , with j 2
{LA,RA,LF}, is the potential at the left arm (LA), right
arm (RA) and left foot (LF ), respectively. In particular, the
standard 12-lead ECG used in clinical settings is an extension of
the Einthoven’s 3-lead system based on using seven additional
electrodes placed on the chest. Nevertheless, simpler 1-lead
ECG recording systems are increasingly being used in the
context of personal ECG monitoring and wearables.
B. ECG Biometrics
Driven by the distinctiveness and universality of ECG, the
body of work in this field has been steadily growing over the
past few years. Recent surveys of systems based on ECG-based
biometrics can be found in [24], [8], [1]. The most striking
difference between approaches lies in the biometric features
used. The first class of methods is based on time domain feature
extraction, and work by detecting the so-called fiducial points,
i.e., location, amplitude and width of the main ECG waves,
as shown in Figure 1. Some biometric systems also consider
the ST segment, that is, the length of the isoeletric segment
between the S and T waves, as well as the slope of waves. In
Figure 1, the wave slope is accounted for through the extraction
of left and right components of its width. In addition to the
above intra-beat morphological features, inter-beat features such
as Heart Rate Variability and beat patterns (represented by the
RR intervals) can well reflect the specific characteristics of the
subject.
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Fig. 1: Example electrocardiogram and corresponding time-
domain features for ECG-based biometrics. Top: duration
features given by inter-peak distances. Right: amplitude features.
For each wave, we also consider its width at half amplitude
(grey solid lines). To account for asymmetric curves, the width
of each wave is split into left and right components (L and R
segments shown in P and T waves), i.e., before and after the
wave peak.
The second class of methods use frequency domain feature
extraction, meaning that features are obtained after converting
the ECG signal in the frequency domain. Examples include
application of wavelet decomposition and Fourier Transform.
In alternative to time and frequency domain methods, some
biometric systems employ statistical approaches for computing
the distance between enrolment ECG and recognition ECG
directly at the signal level, or analysis of the ECG’s trajectory
in the phase space.
Despite the numerous advantages of ECG-based biometrics,
they also suffer from some limitations, mostly addressed
through the use of multimodal biometrics. These are related
to the time-variant nature of the ECG, which is affected
by physical activity, emotional stress and minor random
disturbances like ectopic beats.
C. The Nymi Band
In this subsection we will outline the capabilities and system
design of the Nymi Band.
The Nymi Band (see Figure 2) is a wristband that in-
corporates an ECG sensor with two electrodes. The bottom
electrode constantly touches the user’s wrist while the band is
worn. In order to allow ECG measurements (most commonly
for enrollment and authentication) the user touches the top
electrode with the index finger of their other hand. As such,
the signal morphology can be expected to be similar to Lead
I of a medical ECG (which measures the potential difference
between the left and right arm). Besides the actual band, the
Nymi ecosystem consists of the Nymi Companion App (NCA)
and Nymi Enabled Applications (NEAs). The NCA is provided
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Fig. 2: The Nymi Band
as an app that runs on the user’s smartphone or tablet. The
NCA performs two main functions, enrollment and activation.
During enrollment, the Nymi Band is paired to an NCA.
The correct pairing is confirmed by displaying a pattern on the
Nymi Band which the user has to verify against a pattern shown
by the NCA (similar to the numerical codes used in Bluetooth
device pairing). The Nymi Band and NCA then agree on a
shared key that binds the Nymi Band to this NCA. Following
pairing, the user is prompted to touch the band’s top electrode
with his index finger, after which their ECG is measured until
a specific amount of ECG data of sufficient quality is captured.
The resulting biometric template is then encrypted and stored
by the NCA on the phone or tablet. Besides the shared secret,
no information is stored on the band at this time.
Activation is performed when the Nymi Band is taken off
and put back on again. Specifically, this event is detected by
the contact between two pins on the inside of the buckle being
interrupted (see Figure 2). As such, the Nymi Band does not
truly perform continuous authentication in the biometric sense,
but authenticates the user once and then detects a possible
change in user identity through the band being taken off. The
activation process is started by the user selecting the appropriate
action in the NCA, after which they can choose to perform ECG
authentication, or to use their backup password. If they choose
ECG, they are again prompted to touch the top electrode to
begin ECG measurement. Unlike enrollment, which runs until
a certain number of seconds of valid ECG data is collected,
activation runs until the NCA is sufficiently convinced of the
wearer’s identity. Once one or several heartbeats are observed
that match the owner’s template, the Nymi Band is put into
activated mode by the NCA. If no matching heartbeats are
observed after 60 seconds, the user is automatically rejected.
Once the Nymi Band is activated, it can be paired with
NEAs. Examples of NEAs include desktop computers (that
can then be unlocked without using a password), wearable
devices like smart watches and even more complex systems
like cars. At the time of writing, the Nymi Band is being
trialled for contactless payments. Initially, the band is paired
with the NEA through a process similar to regular Bluetooth
pairing. The Nymi Band displays a pattern using the five LEDs
(leading to only 32 possible combinations), which the user is
meant to confirm before proceeding. The Nymi Band and the
NEA then use a Diffie-Hellman key exchange to negotiate
a shared key, which is stored directly on the band. After
pairing, the possession of the shared key (i.e., the presence of
the unlocked band) can then be confirmed using a standard
challenge-response protocol.
There is one additional capability of NEAs that is relevant
to the remainder of the paper: The Nymi SDK grants NEAs
direct access to the band’s ECG sensor. Once the band and
an NEA are paired, the NEA can request the collection of an
arbitrary amount of raw ECG data. While this data collection
does not have to be explicitly approved by the user, the sensor
design requires the user to touch the top electrode with their
finger, thus making covert data collection virtually impossible.
It is noteworthy that this functionality has been removed from
the official SDK from version 2.0 onwards.
The Nymi Band’s threat model is described in the Nymi
Whitepaper. The band is designed as a three-factor authen-
tication system. In order to communicate with NEAs, an
attacker has to be in possession of the Nymi Band and the
NCA (typically the user’s phone) and be able to bypass the
biometric authentication. It is noteworthy that the latter, while
not explicitly stated in the Whitepaper, can also be achieved
by using the user’s backup password (e.g., through guessing
a weak password or social engineering). This is particularly
dangerous, as the presence of a second authentication factor
often leads to users choosing weaker passwords [26]. In terms
of bypassing ECG authentication (rather than using a password),
the Nymi Whitepaper claims that
”There is currently no known means of falsifying
an ECG waveform and presenting it to a biometric
recognition system.”
In the following sections we will investigate the validity of
this claim.
III. SPOOFING ECG SIGNALS
In this section, we show that fake ECG signals can be
injected into ECG enabled recognition systems. We start out
with the hypothesis that captured ECG measurements can be
reproduced at the biometric sensors without the benign user
having to be present.
A. Motivation
Like any other physiological trait, ECG signals can be
captured and (digitally) stored for an indefinite amount of time
as the signals are relatively immutable. Biometric samples from
physiological traits do not lose validity and, if the fidelity of
the stored signal is sufficiently high, it is possible to physically
reproduce the actual biometric signal at a later time. This
process does not require the individual from whom the biometric
measurements originate to be present.
In ECG recognition, biometric readings are usually acquired
with the help of an electrocardiograph, which works by
measuring the minute voltage differences of the human heart
over time. With today’s technologies in signal synthesis and
digital to analog conversion, artificially creating electrical
signals that exactly represent stored ECG signals is feasible.
While forging ECG signals is not a concern in the medical
domain, it is potentially problematic for ECG-based authentica-
tion systems. If a biometric system does not feature an agent or
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overseer — or other provisions against someone not using the
biometric sensors as intended — it is susceptible to so-called
presentation attacks. In a presentation attack the attacker tries
to spoof the biometric sensors with an artefact or contraption.
In case of ECG based recognition, the attacker would have
to fake the (time-dependent) voltage levels at the electrodes
interfacing the user with the help of an electrical device that
outputs an ECG signal.
In the remainder of this section, we show that it is indeed
possible to replay previously captured ECG signals. To that
end, we built three hardware contraptions of varying degrees of
sophistication that successfully create and inject ECG signals
into the sensing electrodes of a biometric system based on
ECG. We test our contraptions using the example of the
Nymi Band. In order to estimate difficulty and likelihood of
a presentation attack on ECG recognition, we additionally
evaluate our injection methods along the following non-
technical dimensions:
• Cost: What is the overall cost for building the contrap-
tion and executing the injection? Although high cost
does not deter every attacker, it can discourage less
determined ones.
• Knowledge: Is expert knowledge required to build and
use the contraption or can it be put together following
simple instructions?
• Size: Physical size is a very important factor. If the
contraption used for signal injection is sufficiently
small, an attacker can covertly spoof the biometric
sensors and might even circumvent a guarded biometric
system.
• Signal quality: We quantize and compare the resulting
signal quality of each approach when applied to
injecting ECG signals into the Nymi Band. Obviously,
signal quality directly correlates with the probability of
success for a presentation attack. The conversion from
the (stored) biometric data to the physical biometric
signal should introduce as little noise as possible.
B. Hardware Considerations
We build three contraptions that allow us to forge fake ECG
signals. Since all approaches inject the resulting signal at the
sensing electrodes of the Nymi Band, we design a contrivance
that allows us to interface those electrodes in a convenient way.
As described in the previous section, the Nymi Band has a
locking mechanism, which deauthenticates the wearer of the
band immediately if the band is taken off. When the band is
closed, one of the two sensing electrodes is located on the
inside of the band and faces the wearer’s wrist whereas the
other electrode is accommodated at the outside of the band,
available to be touched with a finger of the other hand. This
way, the electrical circuit is closed and the ECG measurement
can start. If the wearer of the band is recognized, the band goes
to and remains in “authenticated” state as long as the band is
worn.
For ease of use and to allow many successive injection
attempts without opening and closing the Nymi Band, we
modified a genuine charging cable that is included in the
delivery of the band. As can be seen in Figure 3, the part of the
Shorted-out pins Exposed measurement 
electrode
Fig. 3: Modified charger lead. The two pins on the left are
shorted out to put the Nymi Band into “closed” state as soon
as the modified charging lead is attached to the band.
charging lead that interfaces with the band has two shorted-out
pins to let the band think it is closed and conveniently exposes
one of the sensing electrodes in a separate wire.
1) Hardware Waveform Generator: Our first and the most
obvious approach to artificially create an ECG trace is to use
an arbitrary waveform generator. The purpose of waveform
generators is to generate electrical waveforms for testing and
analyzing electronic devices. The generated signal is injected
into the device under test while the device’s (electrical) behavior
is observed and analyzed. The waveform itself is defined as
a time series of voltage levels, based on which the waveform
generator produces the corresponding signal. The resulting
signal exactly matches the predefined voltage levels at the given
points on the time axis and interpolates values in between.
We use a Rigol DG4062 Arbitrary Waveform Generator that
is capable of generating signals of up to 60MHz at a sampling
rate of 500 Mega-Samples per second. These specifications
enable us to transform stored ECG signals to their physical
counterpart with high accuracy. Electrocardiographs commonly
operate at a sampling rate of less than 500 samples per second
when acquiring an ECG trace. This means that higher frequency
components, i.e., more than 250Hz, can not be registered and
hence are not part of the measured signal. Such a frequency
limited signal can easily be synthesized by most of today’s
off-the-shelf hardware waveform generators.
Our signal generator’s two output leads are directly con-
nected to the electrodes of the Nymi Band. In order to optimally
match electrical impedances between signal generator and the
electrodes of the band, we inject the signal through a 75⌦
coaxial cable (see Figure 4). Electrocardiographs most often
feature an instrumentation amplifier with high input impedance
as the first step in the signal acquisition pipeline. The Nymi
Band does not differ in that regard and requires a relatively
low impedance input.
We wrote a software library that loads stored ECG signals
directly into the memory of the Rigol DG4062 Arbitrary Wave-
form Generator, sets the necessary parameters and starts/stops
the signal generation. The program code is available upon
request.
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Fig. 4: Arbitrary waveform generator connected to the Nymi
Band via the modified charging lead. The negative output of
the waveform generator is clamped to the electrode facing the
wrist and the positive output is attached to the second electrode
of the band using the modified charging lead.
2) Software Waveform Generator: Nowadays, almost every
personal electronic device, be it mobile or stationary, possesses
a dedicated sound card or integrated sound functionality to
facilitate analog audio output. Audio signals are an electrical
representation of sound, i.e., a mechanical wave that propagates
through a medium. Thus, sound cards need to be able to
output relatively high-frequency signals. This capability can
be harnessed and lets a sound card be utilized as a low-
frequency waveform generator. In most cases, no hardware
modifications are needed and arbitrary electrical signals can
be readily generated, provided that the sound card is driven
with the right software components. Naturally, a sound card
based waveform generator is not as capable as a dedicated
hardware solution and has many limitations such as a narrow
range for the generated voltage. However, the nature of ECG
signals, which are inherently low-frequency and on the order
of a few hundred microvolts, can be generated by a sound
card without any problems The majority of dedicated sound
cards as well as devices with integrated sound support have
output frequencies of up to 20kHz, which is well than enough. A
software waveform generator based on a sound card is therefore
a viable option for signal injection. It not only drastically
reduces cost, but also simplifies the injection method. Figure 5
depicts a possible setup where a software waveform generator
is run on a laptop that injects the generated signal though its
audio output port.
3) Audio Playback: Instead of using a software waveform
generator and changing the function of the sound card, we
explore the possibility of playing back stored ECG signals
on the sound card as actual sound. Such an approach does
not require specialized software, i.e., a software waveform
generator, and might be executed on any device capable of
outputting analog audio signals. This could reduce effort and
complexity of a presentation attack to a great extent.
The challenge of replicating an ECG signal directly as audio
output consists of transforming the digital representation of
an ECG signal into an audio file that can be played back on
the sound card. We wrote software that filters the ECG signal,
applies the correct scaling of voltage levels, sets the sampling
rate and finally stores the signal as an audio file (WAV format).
Fig. 5: A laptop is connected to the Nymi Band via the modified
charging lead. Setup is analogous to the configuration involving
the hardware waveform generator, apart from the coaxial cable
being plugged into the audio output port of a laptop. The laptop
either runs a software waveform generator or is used to play
back an ECG signal that is encoded in an audio file. The laptop
might be replaced through any electronic device with audio
playback capability.
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Fig. 6: Reference ECG signal compared to the ECG traces
measured when the reference signal is injected using three
different injection methods. The traces are captured by the
Nymi Band and read out with the Nymi software development
kit.
The resulting file can then be played back on almost any device
and potentially injected into the sensors of a biometric system
based on ECG recognition.
The contraption we used for the evaluation of the audio playback
as injection method is identical to the hardware setup in Figure 5.
Nevertheless, the attack can be carried out with any device
capable of analog audio output.
C. Injection Quality
In order to validate the presented signal injection methods
and assess their quality, we select a stored reference signal,
reproduce and inject it using each of the three approaches.
We then compare the reference signal to the traces the
electrocardiograph measures while injection takes place. In
case of the Nymi Band, the captured traces can be accessed
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Approximate Required Physical Signal
cost knowledge size quality
– Hardware waveform generator
$240 high large very high
– Software waveform generator
$50 moderate small high
– Audio playback
$10 moderate very small high
TABLE I: Comparison of injection methods
and read out with the Nymi software development kit (SDK).
In addition to a visual comparison between the stored
signal and the extracted ECG traces, we verify their similarity
numerically. The distance metric for comparison is the (per
sample) mean squared error (MSE). We make sure the reference
signal’s sampling rate matches that of the Nymi Band. Also,
the measured traces might be linearly translated and require
alignment before the calculation of the distance metric. We
determine the constant shift between the stored reference signal
and captured traces by aligning the peaks of the R waves.
Results are show in Figure 6. All three proposed injection
methods manage to reproduce the reference signal remarkably
well and we conclude that the contraptions are effective. It is
evident that signal quality is proportional to sophistication and
cost of the contraption used for signal injection: The hardware
waveform generator achieves the smallest error (mean squared
error of 0.015) as opposed to the audio playback (which is
slightly less accurate and achieves an MSE of 0.017) and the
software waveform generator.
D. Comparison of Injection Methods
In Table I, we present a comparison between our three
injection methods along the criteria outlined above (see Sec-
tion III-A). Not surprisingly, the hardware waveform generator
achieves the highest signal quality, but at the same time entails
the highest cost. Entry-level arbitrary waveform generators
retail at around $250. They are, however, fairly bulky and only
designed for stationary use.
Software waveform generators are not only available for
personal computers, but even smart phones. A low-end smart
phone equipped with an analog audio output costs around $50
as of spring 2016. An ECG signal encoded as an audio file can
even be played back on a cheap portable audio player which
can cost less than $10 and has a tiny form factor.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
In this Section we will outline a number of approaches that
can be used by an attacker to obtain data for a presentation
attack. Based on these attack vectors, we will then discuss our
data collection methodology.
A. Obtaining Data for a Presentation Attack
In Section III we have demonstrated our capability to inject
arbitrary signals into the Nymi Band. However, the attacker
still requires an input ECG signal that is sufficiently close to
Fig. 7: The ECG monitor data is extracted through image
analysis of this plot shown by the software. This models the
threat of an attacker obtaining a photo of the victim’s ECG.
that of the victim. There are multiple conceivable approaches
to obtain this data:
Medical records often contain printouts of a patient’s ECG.
A conventional hospital ECG uses 10 adhesive electrodes to
simultaneously record 12 leads (see Section II for details).
An attacker could obtain these records either electronically
(e.g., through social engineering or a compromised medical
database) or on paper (e.g., by taking a photo of the plots). In
addition, mobile devices that allow patients to monitor their
health at home are becoming more widespread. Besides ECG
monitors for medical use, a number of devices are marketed
for fitness, for example in the form of heart rate monitors
used during cardiovascular exercise. In these cases, the data
could be intercepted during transmission (e.g., to the victim’s
smartphone) or leaked through an insecure or malicious mobile
app.
The Nymi SDK allows NEAs to collect arbitrary amounts
of raw ECG data (see Section II). There are two conceivable
ways in which this might pose a security risk: NEAs have to
be actively paired with the NCA by the owner of the band.
However, this only means they are trusted by the user, not that
they are inherently trustworthy. A rogue NEA could trick the
user into providing (a sample of) his ECG, which would then
allow the owner or developer of the NEA to later use this data
to carry out a presentation attack. A second, probably more
severe, way of abusing the SDK data collection is through a
social engineering attack. Given the novelty of the Nymi Band
an attacker might ask the victim to wear the attacker’s Nymi
Band to test whether it is possible for the victim to unlock
it. Instead of performing regular activation, the attacker could
instead activate the band through the backup password and then
collect the victim’s ECG data through a previously paired NEA
(e.g., on a laptop or the attacker’s smartphone). This attack
is particularly dangerous, as the data is collected directly on
a Nymi Band, rather than a different device that requires the
application of the mapping function (see Section V).
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B. Data Collection
The previous subsection has outlined several scenarios that
might allow an attacker to obtain a victim’s ECG data. We
collect data using a variety of devices to reflect them:
The first device we use is a lightweight medical ECG
monitor, the Heal Force Prince 180B (see Figure 8). The device
has two main measurement modes which use either the built-in
electrodes on the sides of the device or an external 3-lead ECG
cable with disposable electrodes. The first measurement (which
we will refer to as the Palm measurement throughout the paper)
uses the built-in electrodes. Participants were asked to hold
the device as pictured in Figure 8 and to remain still during
the measurement as the ECG recording is highly sensitive to
device movements. When using the built-in electrodes, the
device always records data for a fixed duration of 30 seconds.
Following the palm measurement, we use the 3-lead cable to
record Lead I and Lead II (see Section II for details), which
involves attaching the disposable electrodes to both arms and
the left leg. Unlike hospital ECGs, which capture all 12 leads
simultaneously, this monitor is limited to recording a single
lead. However, by switching the position of the electrodes, all
standard leads can be recorded in sequence. We chose to record
Lead I, which has measurement points similar to the Nymi
Band, and Lead II, which measures the potential difference
between the right arm and left leg. Due to practical reasons
we choose not to collect a full 12-lead ECG. Both leads are
recorded during a medical ECG, as such an attacker could
obtain them by taking a photo of the patient’s medical files. In
order to reflect this, we don’t extract raw data from the device,
but instead obtain it by performing image analysis on the plots
displayed by the software (see Figure 7).
The second device, pictured in Figure 9, is a mobile ECG
monitor that can be attached to a smartphone and transmits
the recorded data via Bluetooth. Following the measurement,
the device provides an instant assessment with regard to
a number of heart disorders. Participants were again asked
to remain still during the 30-second measurement period
to avoid the introduction of additional noise. Following the
measurement, the device creates a pdf report which can be
automatically sent to an arbitrary e-mail address (such as
the patient’s physician). This report contains, aside from the
patient’s personal information, a plot of the recorded ECG data.
The report is sent via e-mail without any encryption or other
security features. Similar to the ECG monitor data, we use
image analysis to extract the raw data from the pdf file.
Lastly, we collect data using the Nymi Band itself. As
outlined in Section II, the Nymi SDK allows Nymi Enabled
Applications (NEAs) to collect raw ECG data once the Nymi
Band is unlocked and paired with the NEA. As a result of
the band’s hardware design, this requires the cooperation of
the user as they have to touch the top electrode of the band
to enable ECG recording. Following the user enrollment and
activation of the Nymi Band we collect 60 seconds of raw ECG
data using the SDK. We used three (identical) developer kits of
the Nymi Band running the SDK version 1.03. It is important
to note that the capability of the band to report raw ECG data
to NEAs has been discontinued from SDK version 2.0 onwards.
However, it is still possible to collect data by using the legacy
SDK on the developer bands. The final consumer version of the
band has been released in September 2016 and also lacks the
Fig. 8: ECG monitor in palm measurement mode
Fig. 9: Mobile ECG monitor
capability to record raw ECG data. We can’t make any claims
on the success of our attack on this new version, although,
based on the published changes in the consumer version, we
can not see any structural obstacles to the attack still being
successful.
C. Participant Recruitment and Ethical Considerations
This project has been reviewed by and received clearance
from the Central University Research Ethics Committee of
the University of XXXX, reference number YYYY2. The
main ethical concern when gathering ECG data is the sensitive
nature of the data itself. This sensitivity stems from the fact
that a variety of heart disorders can be diagnosed using ECG,
including disorders the participant may not have previously been
aware of. The possibility of false positives (i.e., the incorrect
diagnosis of a condition) in conjunction with the fact that none
of the researchers are trained medical professionals led us to the
decision of disabling all diagnostic capabilities of the devices
used and inform all participants accordingly. Since a future
diagnosis based purely on the data is theoretically possible,
we store all datasets anonymized to erase any links between a
potential condition and a single participant. Given the above
concerns, we required participants to be at least 18 years old
as the only criteria for inclusion in the study.
We recruited a total of 41 participants (21 female, 20 male)
through mailing list adverts and social media. Participants were
2Blanked during peer review
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made aware that the research involves ECG biometrics, but were
only told the specific purpose of the data collection afterwards.
Participants were paid in cash for their participation.
V. MAPPING FUNCTION
In this section, we show how to generate attack signals for
the Nymi Band using ECG data from different sources. The
method is based on the derivation of mapping functions, i.e.,
functions that transform signals recorded from one device, the
source, in order to resemble the morphology of the signals
from a target device. In our case, the target device corresponds
to the Nymi Band. In other words, we aim to find a function
that, given in input an ECG signal from a source device, is
able to produce the “same” signal as if it was recorded on the
target device.
In this way, the mapping function can mitigate and even
eliminate the statistical differences in biometric features that
arise from using different measurement devices and modes. In
Figure 11, we compare the mean ECG signals recorded for the
same individuals but from different devices, showing that the
signals exhibit device-specific morphologies, especially as far
as amplitude features are concerned. For instance, we observe
that for both subjects the palm measurements yield a more
prominent T wave, while Lead II signals yields the lowest
T wave peak. Similarly, in both cases the P waves obtained
from Lead I and the mobile ECG monitor stand above those
of the Nymi Band and Lead II, and the R wave of Lead II has
the least amplitude. These observations demonstrate that many
discrepancies in the ECGs are device-specific and thus can be
addressed by the application of mapping functions.
Figure 10 shows a summary of the methods for estimating
mapping functions and for generating attack signals. Let S and
T be the source and target devices, respectively. Let J be the
set of ECG features described in Figure 1, and I be the set
of subjects we use for computing the mapping. The training
dataset consists of the sets {ECGSi }i2I and {ECGTi }i2I of
ECG signals recorded, for each subject i 2 I , with the source
and target device, respectively. The method is based on the
following steps:
1) Feature extraction. From the input ECG data, we extract
the relevant biometric features. The outputs of this step are,
for each subject i 2 I , sets of discrete probability distributions
DSi = {DSi,j}j2J and DTi = {DTi,j}j2J , where DSi,j (DTi,j)
is the distribution of ECG feature j for subject i in the
source (target) signal. Specifically, we consider the time domain
features summarized in Figure 1 and apply the algorithm of
[2] for their detection.
2) Mapping estimation. This boils down to an optimisation
problem (described in Section V-A) where we seek to find
an optimal mapping, i.e., a set of transformation functions
f = {fj}j2J with fj : R  ! R, such that, for each feature j
and subject i, they minimise the statistical distance between the
transformed source distribution fj(DSi,j) and the corresponding
target distribution DTi,j 3. In other words, fj transforms values
3Technically, for discrete distribution D, fj(D) is the distribution whose
support is the image of supp(D) under fj (supp (fj(D)) = fj [supp(D)])
and with probability mass function defined, for x 2 supp (fj(D)), by
fj(D)(x) =
P
x02f 1j [x]
D(x0) where f 1j [x] is the preimage of x under
fj , that is, all the elements x0 2 supp(D) such that x = fj(x0).
of feature j from device S in order to be as close as possible,
statistically speaking, to the values of the same feature from
device T . We restrict the search to linear functions, of the
form:
fj(x) = ajx+ bj (1)
Note that linear mappings are adequate in this context because
the amplitudes of the ECG wave peaks along different leads
are linearly related [14]. Moreover, unlike more complicated
transformation functions (e.g. polynomial or logarithmic), linear
mappings do not suffer from over-fitting problems when using
small training datasets [11].
Figure 12 compares the distributions of a selection of ECG
features before and after applying the mapping function. In
this case, Lead II is the source device and the Nymi Band
is the target. Input data is obtained from a subject in our
training set. The plots demonstrate that, after the transformation,
the distributions of source features (blue bars) practically
overlap with the corresponding target distributions (red bars),
consistently reducing the statistical differences observed for
the initial, non-transformed, source features.
Once estimated, the mapping f between S and T is used to
generate attack signals for device T starting from new signals
recorded with S. Let i0 62 I be our victim, for which we possess
an S-signal ECGSi0 . The procedure, illustrated in Figure 10 (b),
consists of the following steps:
1) Extract the feature distributions DSi0 from the source signal
ECGSi0 .
2) Apply the estimated mapping function f to derive the
transformed features distributions: f(DSi0) = {fj(DSi0,j)}j2J .
3) Produce an attack signal by generating a synthetic ECG
signal out of the transformed features f(DSi0), as explained in
Section V-B.
In Figure 13, we compare the original source signal, the
corresponding attack ECG generated from the transformed
features and the target signal of a participant from the training
set. We observe that the attack signal prominently improves on
the original one, in some sections being virtually identical to
the target signal that we aim to reproduce. This demonstrates
the effectiveness of our synthetic ECG generation: as the
transformed ECG features get closer to the target features,
the generated attack signal better emulates the target signal.
Nevertheless, the mapping function is designed to be as general
as possible and to be effective for the whole training dataset,
which explains why not all subject-specific differences can be
eliminated, see for instance the higher P wave of the attack
signal in plot (a), or the lower T wave in plot (b).
We would like to stress the generality of our method, which
mostly relies on estimating linear transformations between sets
of biometric features. Indeed, the method can be easily extended
to support other classes of biometrics, provided the availability
of algorithms for feature extraction and generation of synthetic
signals.
A. Optimization Problem
We formulate the problem of finding the best mapping
function as a non-linear constrained single-objective optimiza-
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tion problem that we solve using a genetic algorithm [9]. The
problem is defined as follows:
minimize
(aj ,bj)j2J
X
i2I⇤
d
 
f(DSi ),DTi
 
(2)
subject to
i2I,j2J
aj , bj 2 [k?j , k>j ] (3)
aj ·DS,mini,j + bj 2
h
DT,min ⇤i,j , D
T,max ⇤
j
i
(4)
aj ·DS,maxi,j + bj 2
h
DT,min ⇤i,j , D
T,max ⇤
j
i
(5)
The decision variables are, for each feature j 2 J , the linear
coefficients aj and bj characterising the transformation fj we
seek to estimate (see Equation 1). The objective function is
the sum over subjects i 2 I⇤ ✓ I of the distance between
the transformed source distributions of i, f(DSi ), and the
corresponding target distributions DTi . Here d is a generic
distance measure (discussed later). In particular, I⇤ is a subset of
the training set I and is obtained as follows: 1) we compute the
distances d
 
f(DSi ),DTi
 
for all i 2 I; 2) we apply the Grubbs’
test [10] to detect the set of outliers I 0 ✓ I on these distances; 3)
we remove the identified outliers: I⇤ = I \I 0. These three steps
are repeated until a maximum number of outliers is removed or
no further outliers are identified. The rationale for considering
I⇤ instead of I in the objective function is that we do not
want to penalise mappings that perform well for most subjects
and poorly for few of them (the outliers). This approach has
the added advantage to bypass subjects with inaccurate input
ECG data, e.g., through noise introduced through excessive
movement. These cases are indeed very likely to be identified
as outliers.
Regarding the feasible region of the optimization problem,
Equation 3 ensures that the linear coefficients are bounded in
some real-valued interval [k?j , k>j ]. The purpose of Equations
4 and 5 is to constrain the ranges of the transformed source
features, in a way that they are similar to the ranges of the target
features. Preliminary results showed that these constraints are
crucial to ensure that the corresponding attack signal resembles
a biologically realistic ECG. For subject i and feature j, let
DT,mini,j and D
T,max
i,j be the minimum and the maximum values
of distribution DTi,j , respectively4. We define the lower and the
upper bounds for the transformed features as:
DT,min ⇤j = (1 q)·min
i2I
DT,mini,j and D
T,max ⇤
j = (1+q)·max
i2I
DT,maxi,j
where q 2 (0, 1) is a factor for relaxing the range width. The
resulting range constraints are given, for all points x in the
support of the source distribution DSi,j by:
aj · x+ bj 2
h
DT,min ⇤j , D
T,max ⇤
j
i
. (6)
Note that the number of such constraints quickly explodes with
the number of subjects, features and distinct data points per
feature. However, by the monotonicity of the linear mappings,
it suffices to check Equation 6 only for the minimum and
maximum values of DSi,j , denoted respectively by D
S,min
i,j and
DS,maxi,j , thus yielding Equations 4 and 5. Importantly, this
implies that our estimation method supports not just linear
functions, but general monotonic functions.
Statistical distance. The distance function of Equation 2 is
defined as the mean of the statistical distances between the
transformed and the target distributions over all the features:
d
 
f(DSi ),DTi
 
=
1
|J |
X
j2J
ds
 
fj(D
S
i,j), D
T
i,j
 
.
where ds is a generic statistical distance. Among the possible
candidates for ds, we chose the L2 distance between distribu-
tions. Let FSi,j and FTi,j be the piece-wise linear estimations
of the cumulative distribution functions of f(DSi,j) and DTi,j ,
respectively. Then, we define ds as the L2 distance between
functions FSi,j and FTi,j [22, Chapter 1]:
ds
⇣
fj(D
S
i,j), D
T
i,j
⌘
= wj
 Z DT,max ⇤j
DT,min ⇤j
⇣
FSi,j(x)  FTi,j(x)
⌘2
dx
! 1
2
where wj = DT,max ⇤j   DT,min ⇤j is introduced as a normal-
isation factor. In the implementation, the above integral is
approximated using a composite mid-point quadrature formula.
4With abuse of notation, the minimum and maximum of a discrete distribution
D are meant as the minimum and maximum of its support.
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B. Synthetic Signal Generation
Synthetic ECG signals are generated as the sum of Gaussian
functions, used to reproduce the typical bell-shaped curves of
the ECG waves and parametrised by sampling values from a
given set of feature distributions. As previously explained, for
attack signals we consider ECG features after the application
of some mapping function.
The method extends [16], [2] in order to support asymmetric
ECG waves, which are physiologically more accurate, thus
leading to attack signals that better emulate the Nymi Band’s
ECG, as discussed in Section V-C.
Let (PP1, . . . ,PPn 1) be the sequence of PP intervals de-
tected from the source signal. The sequence is used to determine
the beginning of each heart cycle such that, for h = 1, . . . , n,
the h-th heart cycle starts at time Th = T0+
P
k<h PPk, where
T0 is the offset of the first P wave.
For each ECG wave kind w 2 {P,Q,R, S, T} and heart
cycle h = 1, . . . , n, the considered features are: wave amplitude,
Aw,h; wave peak location relative to the start of the h-th cycle,
Lw,h; and left and right components of the wave width at
half amplitude, W lw,h and W
r
w,h. Note that peak locations are
easily derived from the interval features shown in Figure 1.
The synthetic ECG at time t is defined as follows:
s(t) =
nX
h=1
X
w2{P,Q,R,S,T}
G
⇣
t, Th + Lw,h1 , Aw,h2 ,W
l
w,h3 ,W
r
w,h4
⌘
(7)
where G
⇣
t, Th + Lw,h1 , Aw,h2 ,W
l
w,h3
,W rw,h4
⌘
is the value at
point t of an asymmetric Gaussian curve centred at Th+Lw,h1 ,
with amplitude Aw,h2 , and full width at half maximum made
of left component W lw,h3 and right component W
r
w,h4
. G is
given by:
G
 
t, L,A,W l,W r
 
= A · exp
 
 4 · log 2 · (t  L)
2
W (t)2
!
where W (t) = W l if t  L and W (t) = W r otherwise.
Note that in Equation 7 the features used to generate the
Gaussian curve are not necessarily drawn from the same heart
cycle h. Specifically, for each cycle h, we randomly sample
the heart cycles h1, . . . , h4 from which location, amplitude
and width features are extracted. Based on preliminary results,
among the possible sampling strategies, we choose peak loca-
tion and widths from the same heart cycle, i.e., h1 = h3 = h4.
Importantly, such generated synthetic ECGs account for
the specific inter-beat patterns of the subject (another common
ECG biometric feature), since we use the same PP sequences
detected from the source signal.
C. Evaluation
In this section, we perform an in-depth evaluation of the
methods for estimating mapping functions and generating
synthetic signals. The aim of the following experiments is
to obtain insight into HeartID, the Nymi Band’s authentication
and biometric recognition library, in order to devise the best
design choices for our methods, such as the ECG features to
include in the mapping or the filtering algorithm to use in the
ECG detection procedure. There is only very little information
available about the algorithms used in HeartID apart from [6]
which proposes a continuous biometric recognition system
based on ECG called HeartID.
Unfortunately, it remains unknown to what degree the
techniques and algorithms described in [6] have been included
in the authentication library currently being used by the
Nymi Band’s companion app. As such, we do not have any
prior knowledge of the classifiers or features used in the
authentication process. Nevertheless, we can use the NCA
as an oracle by querying it with an ECG signal and recording
the response (i.e., an accept or a reject of the signal).
The main obstacle to such an extensive analysis is the time
needed to inject attack signals using a waveform generator or a
sound player. To overcome this limitation we devised another
kind of attack, called offline attack, which is instantiated by
directly interfacing with HeartID through the API calls of
the NCA (Nymi Band’s companion app). We implemented a
simple Android app that allows setting up previously stored
biometric templates and performing authentication for arbitrary
attack signals, at a rate of hundreds of signals per minute,
without requiring a waveform generator or Nymi Band. Our
devised Android app does not require physical ECG input, but
accepts biometric template and biometric samples in digital
form via a command line interface and forwards them to the
HeartID library. For every authentication attempt, the library’s
authentication decision is stored in a database by our Android
app for later analysis.
We remark, however, that the final results of Section VI
are obtained online, i.e., using the actual Nymi Band.
The experiments below were performed on a selection of 8
subjects from the training set. For each experiment, subject and
device, we tested 20 randomly generated attack signals. We
recall that the synthetic ECG is generated by sampling features
from distributions, hence the reason of their randomness. The
reported success rate (SR) is the ratio between successful
authentications and total attempts. As expected, the enrolment
signals used to build the biometric templates yielded an SR of
100%.
Filtering. We evaluate the adequacy of our ECG filtering
algorithm, which builds on a Savitzky-Golay (SG) smoothing
filter [17]. We applied the SG filter to the enrolment signals,
obtaining for them an SR of 100%. Stronger SG smoothing
parameters resulted in SRs below 63%. We also wanted to assess
how noise affects authentication chances. To this purpose, we
added to the filtered signal white Gaussian noise with standard
deviation computed from the enrolment signal. These yielded
an SR of 100%, demonstrating that the filtering method of
HeartID can equally support noisy and filtered ECG data. Note
that the above experiments did not require the generation of
synthetic ECGs.
Synthetic signal generation. Here, we assess the fit of our
synthetic ECG signals. To this purpose, we generated signals
drawing on the features detected in the enrolment ECGs, and
reproduced in the same order. These signals resulted in an
overall SR of 75%, with an SR of 100% for 5 out of 8 subjects.
To understand if HeartID is sensitive to all the ECG waves, we
further produce signals where one of the waves is systematically
suppressed by setting its amplitude to 0. For each wave kind, the
obtained SR was 0%, suggesting that all ECG waves are used
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in the biometric template. In a variation of the first experiment,
we test signals with symmetric waves, resulting in an SR drop
from 75% to 15%. This motivates our claim that asymmetric
waves are needed in order to produce realistic and successful
attack signals. Finally, we report that subject-specific ECG
features are indeed central for authentication: signals generated
using default parameters from literature [4] produced an SR of
0%.
Statistical distance. Now that we have proved the adequacy
of the filtering and synthetic signal generation algorithms,
the next step is evaluating the mapping function. In this
experiment we want to assess how different statistical distances
in the optimisation problem of Section V-A affect the success
rate. Here, we restrict to one-2-one mappings, i.e., mappings
estimated over data from a single subject. In contrast to the
default mappings, one-2-one mappings are tailored to the
subject, meaning that the resulting attack signal better mimics
the target ECG. However, these cannot be used to instantiate
an attack, since they require the victim’s enrolment signal. We
compare the previously introduced L2 distance with the  2
index for empirical distributions and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
statistic (KS) [5]. Using L2, we get an overall SR of 49.9%,
while for  2 and KS, the SR is 29.5% and 39.6%, respectively.
This supports our choice of L2.
Mapping strategies. We finally evaluate a number of alternatives
to the default mapping functions. Signals generated using the
default settings, where the mapping is estimated from the whole
training dataset and considers the full set of ECG features,
resulted in an SR of 26.2%. Slightly worse success rates are
obtained when some of the features are not transformed, i.e.,
left as detected in the source signal: the overall SR is 22.8%,
21.1% and 20% if excluding, respectively, widths, peak intervals
and both. As expected, the exclusion of amplitude features has
shown no significant success. We get comparable results when
considering sub-optimal mappings in place of the best mapping
function found by the optimisation algorithm: for the second
and third best mappings, we have SRs of 21.5% and 21.9%,
respectively. We also learnt that one-2-one mappings estimated
from one single subject are mostly ineffective for attacking a
different subject (SR = 4.4%), thus confirming the importance
of gathering a substantial training dataset. Another alternative
that performed poorly (SR = 11.5%) is building a mapping from
a single “super-individual”, obtained by merging the features
distributions across all subjects.
VI. RESULTS
We conduct the signal injection attack by combining the
building blocks described in the previous sections. After
enrolling a user into the Nymi Band, we first inject the raw data
that was collected using each of the devices (see Section IV).
Following that, we apply the mapping function, which has been
trained on the initial set of users (i.e., not including the user
that is being attacked) to obtain the transformed signals. As
outlined in Section V, the mapping function employs random
sampling of features to generate the attack signal. We use
between 2 and 4 repetitions of this sampling process and report
whether at least one of them was accepted by the Nymi Band.
As the Nymi Band does not limit the number of authentication
User Lead I Lead II Mobile Palm Combined Nymi
1 7 7 7 7 7 3
2 7 3 7 7 3 3
3 7 7 7 7 7 7
4 7 7 7 7 7 3
5 7 7 3 7 3 3
6 7 7 7 7 7 3
7 7 7 7 7 7 3
8 N/A N/A 3 7 3 7
9 N/A N/A 7 7 7 3
10 7 7 7 7 7 3
11 7 7 7 7 7 3
12 3 7 3 7 3 3
13 3 7 7 7 3 3
14 7 7 3 7 3 3
15 3 7 7 7 3 7
16 7 7 7 7 7 7
17 N/A N/A 7 7 7 3
18 7 7 7 7 7 3
19 7 7 7 7 7 3
20 3 7 3 7 3 3
21 3 7 3 7 3 3
TABLE II: Results of injecting the unmodified raw data.
”Combined” refers to the combination of all non-Nymi devices.
The tick marks signify users that were successfully attacked.
User Lead I Lead II Mobile Palm Combined
1 7 7 7 3 3
2 7 3 7 7 3
3 7 7 7 7 7
4 7 7 7 7 7
5 3 7 3 3 3
6 7 7 7 7 7
7 7 7 7 7 7
8 N/A N/A 3 7 3
9 N/A N/A 7 7 7
10 7 7 3 7 3
11 7 7 7 7 7
12 3 7 3 7 3
13 3 7 7 7 3
14 3 7 7 7 3
15 3 7 3 3 3
16 7 7 7 7 7
17 N/A N/A 7 7 7
18 3 7 7 7 3
19 3 7 7 3 3
20 3 7 3 7 3
21 3 7 3 3 3
TABLE III: Results of injecting the data generated by applying
the mapping function. The shaded cells show the results that
differ from Table II. Due to source and target device being
identical, the mapping function is not applied to the Nymi
SDK data. The tick marks signify users that were successfully
attacked.
attempts a user can make, the only cost of repetitions lies in an
increased time required to carry out the attack. Due to space
constraints we report only the results of injecting the ECG
signals by playing back .wav files using an off-the-shelf music
player. As we have discussed in Section III, the performance
that can be expected is similar for all three devices, and the
.wav playback poses the lowest technological barrier for the
attacker, both in terms of cost and compactness. The raw results
of our analysis are shown in Table II and III, a summary is
shown in Figure 14. For 3 out of 21 users we were unable to
collect high-quality signals using the external electrodes of the
ECG monitor, leaving us with 18 attack attempts for the Lead
I and Lead II data sources.
Not surprisingly, the success rate of injecting data collected
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Fig. 14: Fraction of users successfully attacked. Results are
shown for raw data and the data obtained by applying the
mapping function.
with the Nymi Band is the highest. With the exception of four
users, using this data resulted in unlocking the band, leading to a
success rate of 81%. However, two out of the four unsuccessful
users (3 and 6) failed to authenticate themselves following
enrolment. This hints that the failure of the attack is most
likely a consequence of erratic or noisy data being collected
during the enrolment phase. Injecting the Lead II measurement
succeeded only for a single user. Intuitively, this makes sense
since Lead II measures voltage between the left leg and right
arm (rather than the left and right arm, which is approximately
what the Nymi Band observes). Conversely, Lead I performs
relatively well in the attack, succeeding in five out of 21 users
(24%), most likely being a result of the similar measurement
points. Based on this intuition, one would expect the palm
measurements to perform similarly well, as the measurement
points (palm of the left hand and index finger of the right hand)
are even closer to those used by the Nymi Band (wrist of left
hand and index finger of right hand). However, using these
measurements caused the attack to fail for all users (and is the
only data source to do so).
Applying the mapping function considerably improves these
results, particularly for those data sources that performed poorly
initially. The success rate for using Lead I data improves from
28% to 50%. The Palm measurements, which were initially
unsuccessful for all users, could be used for successful attacks
on 5 users, thus increasing the success rate from 0% to 24%.
The mobile ECG monitor data source is the only one where
applying the mapping function causes the attack to fail for one
user. This is most readily explained by the unmodified data just
being on the edge of being accepted. The only data source for
which the mapping function had no effect (positive or negative)
is the Lead II data obtained from the ECG monitor. This could
be either due to limitations of the mapping function (such
as the precise feature set of the Nymi Band being unknown),
or due to important biometric information simply not being
present in this lead. The former case could possibly be remedied
by obtaining a better understanding of the biometric features
involved (which is difficult in a blackbox scenario as presented
by the Nymi Band). In the latter case, it is not possible to find
a mapping between the feature distributions, thus requiring the
attacker to obtain a different source of ECG information. In
the medical domain it is necessary to measure multiple ECG
leads as they contain different kinds of information, so it is
not implausible that this is similar for identifying (biometric)
information.
Overall, the attacker’s chance of success is 81% assuming
they have obtained a measurement through the Nymi Band,
and 62% if they have only obtained data from the remaining
sources. The latter is computed as the fraction of users for
which at least one of the four data sources led to a successful
activation of the band (shown as the ”Combined” column in
Table II and III)
VII. RELATED WORK
The increasing popularity of biometrics as an authentication
mechanism has sparked research into a variety of attacks.
Multiple approaches to imitate users or forge measurements
have been proposed, including attackers modifying their own
behavior and attacks being carried out automatically.
Sharif et al. demonstrate an attack on face recognition
systems that relies on the attacker wearing a pair of printed
eyeglass frames [21]. Their approach enables the attacker
to both impersonate a victim and to evade face detection.
The attack treats the classifier as a whitebox (i.e., assumes
knowledge of the internals) and highlights the danger of using
machine learning in adversarial settings.
Tey et al. propose an attack on keystroke dynamics (distinc-
tive typing patterns), targeting systems using the biometric for
password hardening [25]. The attack assumes the password to
be known to the attacker, who then has to mimic the legitimate
user’s keystroke dynamics while typing it. The authors devise a
system that gives positive and negative feedback to the attacker
regarding their closeness to being accepted. This feedback
relates to individual features, such as character hold times and
interkey times (i.e., the time between pressing two individual
keys). Depending on the information given to the attackers,
a false accept rate of up to 99% is achieved, suggesting
that it is possible for humans to adapt their own typing
patterns enough to fool state-of-the-art systems. Nevertheless,
this approach assumes that both the password and the typing
patterns are known, which requires either use of a keylogging
device or a password database compromise. In addition, it is
doubtful whether this approach can be adapted to continuous
authentication systems that work on free texts, rather than short
passwords.
Touchscreen input biometrics have gained immense popu-
larity over the past few years due to the rise of smartphones,
tablets and other touchscreen devices. Zheng et al propose
an authentication system based on touchscreen input and also
measure the advantage gained by attackers through observing
the victim [27]. The results indicate that simple observation is
not enough to trick the system, although their work assumes
that the attackers have no specific knowledge of the system’s
features. As such, the failed impersonation could be due to
insufficient information, or the fact that touchscreen inputs are
inherently difficult for humans to mimic. Serwadda et al. take
a different approach by building a Lego robot to carry out the
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attack, rather than having a human modify their behavior [20].
Instead of using biometric data from the targeted legitimate user,
they create a “catch-all” attack based on population statistics.
Using a subset of all users, they train the robot to perform
swipes and scrolls in a way that is sufficiently common for
a high number of users. Carrying out the attack increase the
system’s Equal Error Rate (EER) by between 339% and 1004%.
At present, authentication systems based on touchscreen inputs
are not commercially available, causing the authors to create
their own. While they loosely base their features and system
design on the popular work by Frank et al. [7], the initial (i.e.,
before the attack) EER (13%) of the system is much higher
even after excluding users exhibiting poor error rates. Unlike
a regular single-target imitation attack, the proposed attack
targets multiple users at once and therefore requires an overlap
between users’ templates that would be unlikely to be found in
systems with lower error rates. As such it is doubtful whether
the described attack is as effective or applicable at all when
using state-of-the-art systems.
VIII. DISCUSSION AND COUNTERMEASURES
In the previous sections we have outlined an effective
presentation attack against ECG biometrics in general and
have shown its effectiveness when applied to the Nymi Band.
Most generally, there are two main approaches to mitigate the
attack:
The first approach is liveness detection. Liveness detection
attempts to detect an injected signal and distinguish it from
a signal originating from a human. This technique has been
applied with varying degrees of effectiveness for other biomet-
rics. The case of fingerprint readers in particular showcases
that this is most likely an arms race between system designers
considering more indications of liveness (e.g., the presence
of skin oils or moisture for fingerprint readers) and attackers
spoofing these indicators.
The second approach would be to keep the biometric data
secret, thus attempting to prevent the attacker from obtaining
any of the victim’s ECG data. One could make the case that
the Nymi Band’s SDK should not allow for ECG data to
be recorded, either through NEAs or otherwise. Disabling
this functionality would make it at least significantly harder
for the attacker to directly obtain data with the correct ECG
morphology. As creating the mapping function requires training
data from the target device, making this data hard to obtain
would also raise the bar to carry out the attack. However,
it might still be possible to determine the device-specific
effects on the signal by analysing the hardware, rather than
through empirical analysis of recorded signals. As we have
demonstrated, the mapping function allows the attacker to
obtain data from an arbitrary device and use it to attack
the authentication system. While the probability of success
somewhat depends on the device, we have demonstrated
successful attacks using all of the devices we analyzed. Due
to the large variety of devices recording ECG (e.g., medical
ECG monitors, fitness devices, e-health) for purposes other
than authentication, we do not consider keeping the ECG data
secret a viable strategy.
In this work we have applied the mapping function in a way
that allows us to attack an ECG-based authentication system
with data collected on a different device. However, the same
approach can be used to improve the interoperability of a
biometric across different devices. For example, once a user
is successfully enrolled for one device (e.g., a smartphone for
the touchscreen input biometric), he could be authenticated on
any other device without the need for re-enrolment, provided
a mapping function between these devices has been trained
beforehand.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this work we have presented a novel presentation
attack against ECG biometrics and have demonstrated its
effectiveness in attacking the Nymi Band. The Nymi Band
is a commercially available wristband that is currently being
trialled by MasterCard to authenticate the wearer for contactless
payments. After collecting ECG data from 41 volunteers on
different devices, we observed that the distributions of biometric
features vary between these devices as well as different ECG
measurement positions (Leads). This presents an attacker with
difficulties when performing a presentation attack with data
gathered on a different device. To address this challenge we
describe a so-called mapping function, which transforms ECG
signals measured on any device to change its morphology to
match that of the Nymi Band. We use half of the subjects in
our dataset to train the mapping function while the remainder
is set aside to evaluate the actual attack. We use a number of
signal injection methods, including a hardware signal generator
and the playback of an ECG signal encoded as a .wav file.
As such, the technological barriers to carry out the attack are
extremely low in terms of both cost and hardware requirements.
Our results show that injecting ECG data collected with the
Nymi Band shows the highest success rate (81%). When using
only the remaining signal sources we achieve a success rate
of 43%, which increases to 62% after applying the mapping
function.
Our results confirm the seriousness of the attack. Due to the
universality of the mapping function and our signal injection
devices, we expect the attack to show similar performance
against other ECG-based authentication systems. We intend to
further explore this once more systems become commercially
available.
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